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Cham: Springer, 2017. Pp. xi1353. $89.99 (cloth).The three volumes from the Vienna Circle Institute reviewed here could be
treated under the heading of “internationalization.”1 Although this is not an
emic category of these works—they are not discussing explicitly how logical em-
piricism became an international movement—by reading them from this per-
spective we may ﬁnd exciting and proﬁtable directions for new work in the his-
tory and philosophy of science.
The Viennese branch of logical empiricism started as a local seminar group
organized by Moritz Schlick in 1924. Although it continuously grew, it never
became bigger than a selection of between 15 and 20 enthusiastic scholars. Af-
ter what Friedrich Stadler called the constitutive and nonpublic phases of the
circle, the ambitious movement entered the stage ofﬁcially with their manifesto
in 1929. Taking the growing interest in the movement at face value, the usualHOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, vol. 8 (Spring 2018).
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Astory presents the internationalization of logical empiricism as a story of un-
questionable success.
Nevertheless, this ‘usual story’ requires clariﬁcation. First, the international-
ization of logical empiricism did not start in 1929: members of the movement
had attended international conferences and had become researchers in various
locations in Europe and the United States before that time. While Rudolf
Carnap taught in Vienna (1926–31), he often visited conferences (and spent
months) outside Austria; later, he settled in Prague, where Philipp Frank had
taught since 1912. Otto Neurath never stayed in one place very long: during
the 1920s and 1930s, he visitedMexico, the United States, Greece, The Hague,
and Moscow. Herbert Feigl had moved to the United States already in 1931
(stirring up American philosophy from within); Schlick taught at Stanford (1929)
and Berkeley, California (1931–32); Karl Menger also visited the United States
(1930–31) after working as L. E. J. Brouwer’s assistant in Amsterdam (1925–
27). Members of the circle did everything they could to spread the word in the
1930s, but they had already done their best to do so in the 1920s.
Reaching out physically to the international scene, however, is just one form
of “internationalization.” Logical empiricists did not just move out from their
ivory towers but welcomed allies to contribute to the common cause—and en-
emies to provide the required tools to sharpen and reﬁne their approach in Vi-
enna and Berlin. You may internationalize your movement simply by sitting
at home and being receptive to new ideas from all over the world. Let them
come to you: Vienna became a place of “pilgrimage of foreign scientists and art-
ists,” as Ilkka Niiniluoto wrote in his contribution to one of the works under
review here, Logical Empiricism and Pragmatism (185–86).
Husserl, Cassirer, Schlick: “Wissenschaftliche Philosophie” im Spannungsfeld von
Phänomenologie, Neukantianismus und logischem Empirismus, edited by Matthias
Neuber, aims to represent three different forms of European scientiﬁc philoso-
phy, but it also documents the ﬁrst international contacts of logical empiricism.
During this phase of its internationalization, logical empiricism had just come
into existence in the works of Schlick and Hans Reichenbach. That birth was
marked by critical evaluation of and discussion with phenomenology and neo-
Kantianism. What ties these three philosophies together is the “rejection of
any form of speculative metaphysics . . . and a commitment to ‘scientiﬁc philos-
ophy’” (1). The volume aims to analyze these approaches by revealing the pos-
sible senses of ‘scientiﬁc philosophy’ and—at the same time—detecting possible
interconnections.
The essays in part 1 (written by Regina Schidel, Manfred Sommer, Matthias
Wille, and Niels Weidtmann) are devoted to Edmund Husserl and phenome-
nology, speciﬁcally, to Husserl’s relation to Schlick, his ideas on geometry, and199
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Ahis Crisis-studies. Usually, a reviewer should not be concerned about what is
missing from a volume ﬁlled with enlightening essays, but some obviously per-
fect matches are conspicuously absent. One such case, for example, is Carnap’s
debated relation to Husserl and phenomenology. Another candidate for discus-
sion would be the philosopher of law and social scientist Felix Kaufmann, a self-
professed phenomenologist and another ﬁgure in the insider opposition of the
Vienna Circle. Kaufmann was familiar with both phenomenology and logical
empiricism, so he was able to internalize certain international moments even
in homely Viennese settings. Gustav Bergmann noted in a letter to Neurath
(published in the ﬁrst Yearbook in 1993), however, that Schlick was hostile to
Kaufmann’s phenomenological orientation, so the latter’s approach remained
a mere historical curiosity for a long while.
Part 2 is devoted to neo-Kantianism, especially to Ernst Cassirer’s scientiﬁc
philosophy, with essays by Massimo Ferrari, Christian Möckel, Marco Gio-
vanelli, and ThomasMormann. The last ﬁve essays, written by Friedrich Stadler,
Matthias Neuber, Thomas Uebel, Michael Heidelberger, and Fynn Ole Engler
and Karsten Böger, discuss the ideas of logical empiricism per se. The essays by
Neuber and Uebel about the reevaluation of Schlick’s philosophy deserve special
mention. They argue that Schlick’s mature approach should be seen in new lights,
especially his famous 1930 ‘turn’ and his notorious conception of afﬁrmations.
Even though three collections of the Schlick Studien and many volumes of the
Gesamtausgabe are available, simplistic views often surface about Schlick’s philos-
ophy. These chapters will do a great deal to correct that overly simpliﬁed picture.
The essays inHusserl, Cassirer, Schlick remind us that logical empiricism did
not arise in a vacuum but rather on fertile ground. Logical empiricists, in turn,
provided material for philosophical and ideological opponents as well. In that
process, Schlick’s personality made him a reliable source of new trends for phi-
losophers and scientists outside the Vienna Circle; he became a respectable part-
ner in debates and not just a makeshift provocateur or activist (a picture that is
usually given, e.g., of Neurath).
Logical empiricists, however, established various connections to pragmatists
as well. Their relations could be ordered into three phases: (1) 1900–1924, the
reception phase; (2) 1924–39, the discussion phase; and (3) 1939–50s, the ad-
aptation phase. Phase 1 is practically identical to the regular meetings of the
First Vienna Circle: before World War I, scholars met regularly in Vienna cof-
feehouses to discuss the results of science, philosophy, and the humanities. One
of these panels—documented in the second book under review here, Logical
Empiricism and Pragmatism—was dedicated to pragmatism. Phase 2 is desig-
nated as “discussion” because, around the 1930s, many logical empiricists vis-
ited the United States and became acquainted with pragmatism, while at the200
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Asame time, American defenders of pragmatism came to Europe as well (Sidney
Hook, Ernest Nagel, W. V. O. Quine, Charles Morris); some of these even at-
tended the International Congress in Prague (1934). Finally, “adaptation” is
meant in a two-directional way: on the one hand, acclimatization of logical em-
piricism to the new American environment and the pragmatism there, and on
the other hand, the adaptation of pragmatism and American philosophy of sci-
ence to the logically and technically oriented philosophy of logical empiricism.
Since most of the logical empiricists emigrated to the United States between
1930 and 1938, there are many opportunities to study their interactions both
on the individual and on the “movement” level.
Armed with these categories and ideas, we can read Logical Empiricism and
Pragmatism by following the narrative as Massimo Ferrari and Thomas Uebel
describe and critically reconstruct the personal, institutional, and philosophical
relations (and lack thereof ) between Charles S. Peirce, William James, and the
First Vienna Circle. The events described in Giovanni Rubeis’s essay dealing
with John Dewey’s alleged instrumentalism and Reichenbach’s forgotten paper
on Dewey’s theory of science, along with Maria Carla Galavotti’s chapter on
probability (discussing Ernest Nagel, C. I. Lewis, Carnap, and Bruno de Finetti),
might be seen as belonging to phase 2.
Matthias Neuber, by interpreting the philosophical relations between Wil-
frid Sellars and Herbert Feigl, takes up a peculiar and rarely discussed moment
of phase 3. The essay sheds light on the formation of analytic philosophy when
Sellars and Feigl worked together and inﬂuenced each other with respect to
‘pure pragmatics’. The other relevant article for the adaptation period is Sami
Pihlström’s “Viennese Background of Harvard Neopragmatism,” although the
essay focuses much more on Harvard neopragmatism per se, with some ‘Amer-
ican Carnap’ to be sure, but nothing intrinsically Viennese. While we learn a
great deal about Hilary Putnam and the late Wittgenstein as well, most of the
references dropped along the way are made to Pihlström himself.
While there are two essays that provide general accounts of ‘pragmatism’
(Heikki J. Koskinen on ontology and Donata Romizi on determinism), it is
once again quite interesting that some periods and events from the critical
friendship of the two movements are entirely missing. None of the articles con-
sidered Ernest Nagel’s mediating role, or Dewey’s contributions to the Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Uniﬁed Science, or C. I. Lewis’s papers on meaning and
veriﬁcation and how Schlick and Carnap responded to them. These episodes
are substantially relevant to understanding how logical empiricists received the
ideas of pragmatism and how pragmatism responded to logical empiricism.
Nonetheless, the reconstructions of the early indirect encounters make the vol-
ume an important contribution to the history of analytic philosophy, as well as201
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Asupporting the claim that internationalization could be an armchair activity or,
in this case, a coffeehouse practice.
The volume ends with the regular review and general sections. The latter
contains Ilkka Niiniluoto’s essay on Eino Kaila and the Vienna Circle, which
describes in detail why Kaila went to Vienna and how his visits changed over
time. Here, we ﬁnd the story of an isolated person ﬁnding his own mecca of
scientiﬁc philosophy. Internationalization has two directions in this case as well:
Kaila took Finland to Vienna, and he took Vienna back to Finland.
Günther Sandner’s review essay and a “report/documentation” essay (by
Sandner and Christian Pape) are promising from our point of view. Sandner re-
views two books about the Berlin Group and, with Pape, he compares the Berlin
Society of Empirical/Scientiﬁc Philosophy and Vienna’s Ernst Mach Associa-
tion regarding their stances toward ideology, their worldviews, and their com-
mon ‘late enlightenment’ context.
Some minor technicalities regarding the publishing and the formal editorial
work cannot be passed over. Many chapters contain an unsettling number of
typos; different bibliographical and citation conventions are used in the same
articles, with further mistakes in the footnotes. Although they do not affect
the content of the essays, after a while, all of those mistakes and unstructured
contingencies become quite disturbing. This is even more unfortunate consid-
ering Springer’s high prices and usually neat qualities.
The ﬁnal volume under review, The Signiﬁcance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in
the EuropeanCulture (edited byAnna Brożek, Friedrich Stadler, and JanWoleński),
has signiﬁcant lessons in store. The Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) is a quite inter-
esting phenomenon. It had many ﬁrst-rate philosophers and logicians among its
members and exceeded the Vienna Circle in numbers. It had its own forums and
societies, and its participants developed their ideas in the most diverse ﬁelds pos-
sible. Besides the well-known logical inquiries and the philosophy of science and
physics in particular, we ﬁnd promising and often still unexplored ideas on ethics,
aesthetics, psychology, and philosophy of action and mind.
After Peter Simons’s and Jan Woleński’s general essays on the historiography
of analytic philosophy, Stepan Ivanyk considers the Ukrainian sources and in-
ﬂuences of the LWS in part 1. The essay is exciting not just because it recon-
structs a “certain circumstance, which has not been taken into consideration
in studies on the Lvov-Warsaw School so far” (29), but because it also shows
how philosophical ideas became international mainly through the personal ef-
forts of protagonists.
Parts 2 (with essays by Jan Woleński, Dariusz Łukasiewicz, Jacek Jadacki,
andMaria van der Schaar) and 3 (with essays byWojciechW. Gasparski, Marta
Zaręba, Marcin Tkaczyk, Anna Brożek, and Jacek Jadacki) are devoted to the202
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Ainternational and internal developments of the LWS. Jadacki’s essay titled “The
Lvov-Warsaw School from a Bird’s Eye View” is especially relevant: he claims
that to constitute a school, “what is necessary and sufﬁcient is proper self-
identiﬁcation, location, genealogy and ideology” (211). This consideration im-
plies that being a school requires cohesiveness and loyalty to a particular geo-
graphic area and group.While critical remarks could be made about the validity
of this conception, and wemight be skeptical whether these points are sufﬁcient
to reasonable talk about philosophical schools, it provides such a framework in
which we could consistently talk about the developments in Poland: as the
chapters in The Signiﬁcance of the Lvov-Warsaw School show, the LWS fulﬁlled
all the stated conditions. Nevertheless, while logical empiricism did not meet
these requirements (whether it would meet others is a further question), it sold
their “brand” more efﬁciently. Unfortunately, the volume does not provide an-
swers or hints about this divergence in reception.
Finally, the editors have two remarkable documents up their sleeves. There is
the English translation of Leon Chwistek’s 1912 paper, which is a critical in-
quiry of Principia Mathematica. The paper shows not just that the nature and
alternative systems of logic were the focus of the LWS during its formative years
but reveals that the reception history of Principia still has rare treasures to offer
outside the English- and German-speaking worlds. Chwistek’s paper was pub-
lished in Polish, but Rose Rand translated it in the 1950s, andNika Pona, Adam
Trybus, and Bernard Linsky updated it recently.
The volume ends with Aleksander Wundheiler and Edward Poznański’s “The
Concept of Truth in Physics,” preceded by a detailed editorial introduction
written by the translators (Artur Koterski and Thomas Uebel). Koterski and
Uebel do an excellent job in providing biographical and philosophical informa-
tion about the newly translated article. They compare the paper to Neurath’s
‘philosophy’ and his encyclopedism, providing an interesting and hitherto un-
noticed topic for further research.
Logical empiricism hadmany phases, maintaining connections to lands both
west and east of central Europe. As all of the volumes under discussion show,
while logical empiricists were critical of many of their contemporaries, they
were also receptive in interpreting and forming their ideas. The three volumes
that are discussed here aptly demonstrate these considerations. But given the
differences and deviations, it might be hard to talk about the internationaliza-
tion of logical empiricism. In order to do that, we have to be clear about what
logical empiricism is in the ﬁrst place. Here is a proposal: logical empiricists are
connected via family resemblances (as JanWoleński, in one of his contributions
to The Signiﬁcance of the Lvov-Warsaw School [20], suggests of analytic philos-
ophy) without core ﬁgure(s), essential properties, and commitments shared203
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Aequally among the usual suspects. Rather, we encounter overlapping similari-
ties, recurring patterns, and schemes that are instantiated in numerous forms
and degrees. With this idea in mind, the chapters in these volumes might be seen
as descriptions of family pictures on the wall. We still need to ﬁll in the empty
branches on our historical family tree.
Ádám Tamás Tuboly, Hungarian Academy of Sciences204
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